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CHAPTER 4 
Trusts and Estates 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI 
§4.1. Descent and distribution: Illegitimacy. Vallin v. Bondesson1 
decided that an illegitimate intestate decedent's illegitimate brothers 
and sisters were entitled to inherit ahead of legitimate maternal first 
cousins. 
The legitimate relatives' contention that an illegitimate child 
may inherit only from its mother or maternal ancestors in an 
ascending line was rejected, despite the specificity of General Laws, 
Chapter 190, Section 5.2 The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that 
Sections 5 and 68 of Chapter 190 had to be construed together 
and in light of the manifest purpose of the legislation to mitigate 
the common law disabilities imposed upon illegitimates. Section 5 
makes an illegitimate child an "heir" of his mother, and as an heir 
an illegitimate child can inherit from his illegitimate brothers and 
sisters through his mother within the meaning of Section 6.4-
The Court recognized that its interpretation "would give greater 
rights of inheritance to an illegitimate when inheriting from another 
illegitimate than he would have when inheriting from a legitimate 
person."!1 But, it expressed its belief that the contrary construction 
would pronounce the distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate 
children; legitimates would be allowed to succeed to the estates 
of their illegitimate maternal relatives, but the latter could not 
take from the former. This would conflict with the general objective 
of the statute to remove the rigors of the common law. 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a member 
of the Massachusetts Bar. 
§4.1. 1346 Mass. 748, 196 N.E.2d 191 (1964). 
2 "An illegitimate child shall be heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor, 
and the lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall represent such person and take 
by descent any estate which such person would have taken if living." 
S G.L., c. 190, §6, provides: "If an illegitimate child dies intestate and without 
issue who may lawfully inherit his estate, such estate shall descend ·to his mother 
or, if she is not living, to the persons who would have been entitled thereto by 
inheritance through his mother if he had been a legitimate child." 
4 "We are also satisfied that the sole purpose of the last clause, 'if he had been a 
legitimate child,' is to permit legitimate maternal relatives to inherit where they 
are nearest to the intestate under the laws of descent." 346 Mass. 748, 753, 196 
N.E.2d 191, 194 (1964). 
!I Ibid. 
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§4.2 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 33 
§4.2. Wills: Adopted child as legatee. Under the statutes of the 
Commonwealth an adopted child inherits from the adopting parent 
in the same manner as a natural child,l and a child adopted by a 
testator is entitled to a bequest under the designation of the word 
"child" or its equivalent.2 Prior to 1958 a bequest to a "child" of 
someone other than the testator would not have included the adopted 
child of that person unless it plainly appeared that the testator had 
the intent to benefit the adopted child.8 However, a 1958 statute 
amended the prior law by including an adopted child under the word 
"child" or its equivalent whether the adopting parent or another 
person be the donor, in the absence of contrary indications from the 
terms of the instrument.4 The recent statute is expressly made ap-
plicable only to "grants ... or bequests executed after [its] effective 
date .... " 
In Moore v. CannonlS a testator, who died before 1958, left the 
residue of his estate in trust for the benefit of his wife and children 
and provided: "In the event of the death of any of my ... children 
prior to the death of my . . . wife, leaving a wife or husband or 
issue of him or her surviving, and surviving my said wife," the 
trustee was to pay over the part of the residue which would have 
gone to such child "to those who would have been entitled to 
receive such part of my ... estate had such child died intestate 
vested with the title thereto." A son of the testator died in the 
lifetime of the testor's wife leaving a widow and an adopted child 
surviving him. 
The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the pre-1958 rule of 
construction of non-inclusion of adopted children was rendered 
inapplicable. Under the language of the limitation in question the 
gift over was, in effect, to the statutory heirs of the testator's 
deceased son, the intended distributees being those persons who 
would have taken by the intestacy laws had the son died owning 
the property. The adopted son was a statutory heir. 
Previous cases concerned with pre-1958 instruments have taken 
the position that the terms "issue," "children," and "heirs" would 
not benefit an adopted child of someone other than the donor.6 The 
§4.2. 1 G.L., c. 210, §7. 
2Id. §8. 
8 Ibid. Before the 1958 amendment, §8 read: "The word 'child,' or its equiva-
lent, in a ... bequest shall include a child adopted by the ... testator, unless 
the contrary plainly appears by the terms of the instrument; but if the . . . 
testator is not himself the adopting parent, the child by adoption shall not have, 
under such instrument, the rights of a child born in lawful wedlock to the adopt-
ing parent, unless it plainly appears to have been the intention ... of the testator 
to include an adopted child." 
4 Ibid. As amended by Acts of 1958, c. 121, §1, §8 now provides: "The word 
'child,' or its equivalent, in a ... bequest shall include an adopted child to the 
same extent as if born to the adopting parent or parents in lawful wedlock 
unless the contrary appears from the terms of the instrument." 
Ii 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 929, 199 N.E.2d 1112. 
6 See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Wood, 1121 Mass. 519. 5211-524. 74 N.E.2d 141. 
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present case was thought to be distinguishable in that the specific 
language of the limitation called for such devolution of the property 
as would follow if legal title to it had been vested in the deceased 
son." 
If the gift over were to the "estate" of the deceased son, it would 
seem that in the event that the son died intestate the son's heirs 
including his adopted child would take as statutory heirs.8 The 
provisions of the will in Moore appear to express a similar dis-
positive scheme except that the testator did not desire to benefit 
the legatees of his son's will but restricted the possible distributees 
to those who would be entitled to inherit from the son had he 
died intestate. That the "statutory heirs" were to take as pur-
chasers under the will rather than through the intestacy of the 
son should not be critical in view of the specific issue before the 
Court - whether the pre-1958 rule of construction had been re-
butted. 
§4.3. Wills: Construction; meaning of "next of kin." The fre-
quently litigated question - whether an end limitation in favor of 
testator's "next of kin" means those who answer that description 
at the time of the testator's death or those who would have been 
his next of kin at the time set for distribution had he died then-
came before the Supreme Judicial Court again in First Safe Deposit 
National Bank of New Bedford v. Westgate.1 The testator left the 
residue of his estate in trust to pay the income to his wife during 
widowhood. Stated sums of money were to be paid out of principal 
to his son on marriage and upon attainment of designated ages. 
Upon the death or remarriage of the testator's wife the income 
was payable to the son for life. At the death of his son and after 
the death or remarriage of his widow the trust fund was to be 
held for the benefit of the son's issue, but 
[i]f by reason of death or remarriage or lack of issue living 
at my son's decease, the foregoing provisions cannot be carried 
out, I direct my Trustees to pay over the trust estate then 
remaining, free of all trusts, to my next of kin, according to 
the laws of descent and distribution in intestate estates in 
this Commonwealth.2 
There were spendthrift provIsions affecting both income and prin-
cipal. The testator's widow and son, who was the only child, 
144-145 (1947); Bundy v. United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 80, 15S N.E. 557, 
m (1926); Wyeth v. Stone, 144 Mass. 441, 445-444, 11 N.E. 729, 751-752 (1887) . 
., Compare 5 Restatement of Property §505, Comments c, bb (1940). 
8 If the son died testate, his legatees would take. See Leary v. Liberty Trust Co .• 
272 Mass. 1, 171 N.E. 828 (1950). 
§U. 1!146 Mass. 444, 19!1 N.E.2d 685 (196!1). 
2Id. at 446, 19!1 N.E.2d at 685. 
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survived him. The son survived the widow and died without 
issue. 
The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the testator's son was 
his sole "next of kin" within the meaning of the will and held 
that the corpus of the trust was payable to the executors under the 
son's will. The rule of construction that a gift over to a testator's 
next of kin means those who answer that description at the testator's 
death was held applicableB - the son took a transmissible interest 
under the designation of "next of kin" in the end limitation. 
The decision attributes to the testator an incongruous dispositive 
scheme. If the testator had bequeathed property in trust to pay 
the income to his son for life and designated amounts of principal 
on the son's reaching specified ages with a remainder to the testa-
tor's heirs, it would appear to be extremely unlikely that the 
testator would have meant "heirs" as of the date of his death if 
his son were his only heir at law.4 The testator would not have 
restricted his son to a life estate and a limited part of the principal 
if he intended to benefit him further under the identity of "heirs." 
The incongruity is not as great in the limitation in the Westgate 
case, because the alternative gift to the son's issue did not make it 
certain as of the time of the testator's death that the son would 
acquire the complete interest in the trust.5 It nevertheless seems 
improbable that the donor would have limited the son to a life 
estate and portions of the principal had he anticipated the son 
taking the principal as a remainderman. There would not have 
been any incongruity had "next of kin" been interpreted as having 
meant those who would have been so identified had the testator 
died at the time set for the final distribution of the trust fund. 
No constructional tendency should arise as a result of the spend-
thrift provisions. There is precedent for making a spendthrift pro-
vision a factor in making the canon for the determination of heirs 
at testator's death inapplicable when there is a coincidence of the 
life beneficiary as an heir.6 In those cases, however, the restraint 
on alienation was restricted to the income interest, and it could 
have been urged that had the testator intended that the "heirs" 
B "We consider that when a bequest is made to one or more for life, and 
remainder to the testator's heirs, or next of kin, or relations, or such persons as 
would take his estate by the rules of law if he had died intestate, the bequest is 
to those who are such heirs or next of kin at the time of his decease. unless there 
are words indicating a clear intention that it shall go to ,those who may be his 
relations or next of kin at the time of the happening of the contingency upon 
which the estate is ,to be distributed." Childs v. Russell, 11 Mete. 16, 23 (Mass. 
1846). See also New England Trust Co. v. Watson. 330 Mass. 265. 265-266, 112 
N.E.2d 799. 800 (1953); Tyler v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 314 Mass. 528. 531. 
50 N.E.2d 778. 780 (1943); 3 Restatement of Property §308 (1940); 2 Simes and 
Smith. Future Interests §734 (2d ed. 1956). 
4 See 3 Restatement of Property §308, Comment k (1940). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Thompson v. Bray. 313 Mass. 717. 49 N.E.2d 228 (1943); Boston Safe Deposit 
Be: Trust Co. v. Waite, 278 Mass. 244. 179 N.E. 624 (1932). 
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be ascertained at his death, he in large part would have undone what 
he sought to do by the spendthrift provisions - the remainder 
interest would have been alienable.7 In Westgate both income and 
principal were subject to spendthrift provisions. 
A statute enacted during the 1964 SURVEY year changes the rule 
of construction applied in the Westgate case, and if the same limita-
tion appears in an instrument executed after January 1, 1965, the 
testator will be presumed to have intended to benefit those persons 
who would have been his next of kin had he died at the time set 
for distribution of the corpus.8 
In the Westgate case the testator's widow also survived him. 
Yet, the Court concluded that she was not entitled to take as 
"next of kin, according to the laws of descent and distribution in 
intestate estates in this Commonwealth"; that the words "next of 
kin" are limited to blood relations of the designated ancestor. 
There is local precedent to support this viewpoint.9 On the other 
hand, there is also a line of cases holding that a gift over to the 
heirs of a designated person will include the spouse of such person 
as a statutory heir.10 It is difficult to see why "next of kin" 
restricts the class to blood relatives while "heirs" does not.ll The 
Supreme Judicial Court did not consider it significant that the 
limitation in question also made specific reference to the Massa-
chusetts statutes of descent and distribution. This makes the refer-
ence to the intestacy laws in large part surplusage. 
One of the articulated reasons for the canon of construction that 
a remainder over to the next of kin of the testator means those who 
are his next of kin at the time of his death is that it would correspond 
with the desires of the donor who uses such language. The testator 
usually uses these words, after he has exhausted his specific desires 
to benefit designated beneficiaries, to express his wish to let the 
law take its course.12 If there were intestacy, his widow would 
be entitled to take under the statutes of descent and distribution. 
7 See Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Waite, 278 Mass. 244, 179 N.E. 624 (1932). 
For a line of cases in which spendthrift provisions were not deemed to be signifi-
cant factors, see Perkins v. New England Trust Co., 344 Mass. 287, 182 N.E.2d 308 
(1962), 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.5; Bagley v. Kuhn, 322 Mass. 372, 77 N.E.2d 
312 (1948); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Clarke, 291 Mass. 17, 195 N.E. 758 (1935); 
Rotch v. Rotch, 17ll Mass. 125, 53 N.E. 268 (1899). 
8 Acts of 1964, c. 307. See §4.7 infra. 
9 See Bailey v. Smith, 222 Mass. 600, 602, 111 N.E. 684, 686 (1916); Haraden v. 
Larrabee, 113 Mass. 430, 431 (1873). 
10 Calder v. Bryant, 282 Mass. 231, 184 N.E. 440 (1933); Olney v. Lovering, 167 
Mass. 446, 45 N.E. 766 (1897); Proctor v. Clark, 154 Mass. 45, 27 N.E. 67ll (1891); 
Lincoln v. Perry, 149 Mass. 368, 21 N.E. 671 (1889); Lavery v. Egan, 143 Mass. 
389, 9 N.E. 747 (1887). 
11 See Casner, Construction of Gifts to "Heirs" and the Like, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 
207, 218-228 (1939); II Restatement of Property §§305, 307 (1940). 
12 Whall v. Converse, 146 Mass. 345, 348-349, 15 N.E. 660, 662 (1888). 
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§4.4. Trusts: Governmental claims. In Town of Randolph v. 
Roberts1 a testatrix left property in trust for the benefit of her 
niece. If the income was insufficient to support her properly, the 
trustees were authorized to 
. . . use such part of the sum of said trust estate as may be 
necessary for such purpose, and I give my said trustees the sole 
power of determining whether or not it is necessary to use a 
part of the principal sum for such purposes, and [if] it is so 
determined, what part shall be used and when.2 
The trust assets were of small value - a little more than $5000 and 
a dwelling valued at $4000. 
The niece had received disability assistance from the welfare 
department of the town commencing before the testatrix's death. 
After the trust was constituted the trustee paid $30 a month to the 
niece for her support, room and board, thereby reducing the town's 
obligation from $206 to $176 a month. The town attempted to 
reach and apply the trust corpus for the disability payments made 
to the niece before and after the death of the testatrix. 
The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the disability payments 
made before the testatrix's death, the date the trust took effect, 
could not be recovered from the trust fund; the trust was intended 
to provide for future support. Nor could the town reach any 
part of the trust for its payments after the trust was constituted. 
Since the trust was discretionary, and since the niece had no absolute 
right to the principal or any part of it, her creditors could not 
acquire any greater rights than she had. There was no indication 
that the trustees had exercised their discretion arbitrarily or in 
bad faith. The Court pointed out that the trust was of a small 
amount and that the testatrix probably had the desire to supple-
ment public assistance of her niece or to provide for her welfare if 
the assistance ceased. The town's claim was not given special treat-
ment simply because it was a governmental claim and the Court 
observed that public policy did not preclude public support to 
the beneficiary of a private trust. 
Under the law of some jurisdictions the interest of a beneficiary 
of a spendthrift trust or a trust for support may not be insulated 
from the claims of particular classes of c~imants such as dependents 
of the beneficiary, suppliers of necessaries, those who render services 
or furnish materials to benefit the interest of the beneficiary, and 
the state or federal governments.3 The Supreme Judicial Court 
has, however, not seen fit to treat any class of general creditors 
§4.4. 1 346 Mass. 578, 195 N.E.2d 72 (1964). 
2Id. at 579, 195 N.E.2d at 73. 
3 See 2 Scott, Trusts §§157-157.5 (2d ed. 1956); 1 Restatement of Trusts Second 
§157 (1959). 
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differently from any other." At any rate, it appears that the trust 
in Roberts was discretionary and not a support or a spendthrift 
trust; and the trustee's refusal to reimburse the town for its assistance 
payments should not be considered an abuse of its discretion in 
view of the small value of the trust res and the probable objectives 
of the testatrix. 
§4.5. Trusts: Allocation of capital gains distribution by a regu-
lated investment company. The question, novel for Massachusetts, 
whether a capital gains distribution by an open-end regulated 
investment company is to be allocated to income or principal, 
received a full analysis in the case of Tait v. Peck.1 
The investment company issued a dividend of its shares repre-
senting a distribution of capital gains resulting from sales of securities 
in its portfolio of investments. With the trust instrument silent 
on the matter, the trustee's refusal to assign these shares to the 
income account was challenged. Although the dividend was pay-
able in cash or stock at the trustee's option, the Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled that it was properly allocated to principal. The view 
that a regulated investment company is the functional equivalent 
of a common trust fund and in effect a conduit for passing realized 
gains to the trust was adopted. These gains retained their character 
as principal after distribution to the trust, and it would have made 
no difference had they been distributed in the form of cash instead 
of stock. 
The so-called Massachusetts rule for the allocation of dividends 
treats cash dividends, however large and extraordinary, as income 
and stock dividends as principa1,2 If the dividend is payable in 
cash or stock at the trustee's election, it is to be considered a cash 
dividend whatever the form.B The rule is somewhat arbitrary and 
may produce sporadic inequitable results, but its simplicity provides 
for more convenient and practical trust administration." Excep-
"See Burrage v. Bucknam, !l01 Mass. 2!15. 16 N.E.2d 705 (19!18); Bucknam v. 
Bucknam, 294 Mass. 214. 200 N.E. 918. 104 A.L.R. 774 (19!16). 
§4.5. 1!146 Mass. 521. 194 N.E.2d 707 (196!1). 
2 Third National Bank Be Trust Company of Springfield v. Campbell, !I!I6 Mass. 
552. !l54-!l55. 145 N.E.2d 70!l. 705-706 (1957); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 
Mass. 158, 168-169. 158 N.E. 550. 5!14 (1927); Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101. lOS 
(1868). See !I Scott. Trusts §§256-2!16.4 (2d ed. 1956); 1 Restatement of Trusts 
Second §2!16 (1959). 
a Smith v. Cotting. 2111 Mass. 42, 48-49. 120 N.E. 177. 182-18!1 (1918); 1 Restate· 
ment of Trusts Second §2!16(c) (1959); 5 Scott, Trusts §256.4 (2d ed. 1956). 
"D'Ooge v. Leeds. 176 Mass. 558, 560-561. 57 N.E. 1025. 1025-1026 (1900); !I 
Scott. Trusts §256.!I (2d ed. 1956). 
"A trustee needs some plain principle to guide him; and the cestuis que trust 
ought not ,to be subjected to the expense of going behind ,the action of the 
directors. and investigating the concerns of the corporation. especially if it is out 
of our jurisdiction. A simple rule is, to regard cash dividends. however large. as 
income. and stock dividends. however made. as capital." Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 
101. 108 (1868). 
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tions have been engrafted on this rule, however, so that the sub-
stance of a corporate distribution prevails over the manner in which 
it is made. Thus, a distribution by way of liquidation or return 
of capital is credited to trust corpus although made in the form 
of a cash dividend.1i In like manner, if the substance and intent 
of the corporate transaction is to make a cash dividend, the distribu-
tion is allocable to income although made in the form of stock.6 
Although one of the major reasons for the formulation of the general 
rule was to avoid exhaustive investigation by the trustee into the 
sources of dividends and the intricacies of corporate accounts, the 
obvious realities of the distribution should prevail over any label 
placed upon it. 
If a trust sells a security held by it, realizing a profit, the gain is 
credited to principal. So, too, if a trust participates in a common 
trust fund, a proportionate share of the gains resulting from the 
sale of the fund's securities is allocable to corpus. The trustee's 
objectives in investing in a mutual fund are similar to those for 
participating in a common trust fund - convenience, expert man-
agement, and reduction of risk of loss through diversification. The 
trust's proportionate interest in the securities held by the common 
trust fund is similar to its proportionate ownership of the securities 
in the portfolio of the mutual fund in which it invests. Recog-
nizing that the investment company, unlike the common trust fund, 
is a separate entity from the trustee, the Court in the Tatt case 
observed that it should not be significant that realized gains of 
the common trust fund are not distributed to the participating 
trust while those of the investment company are. "1£ a trustee 
elects to take shares of the investment company in payment of 
any distribution made to him of capital gains, he will be able to 
achieve the same substantive result as that achieved by the common 
trust fund."7 By dropping the entity concept and treating the 
investment company as though it were a conduit for the passing 
of gains to the trust, the economic facts of the transaction are 
acknowledged with only a minor conceptual casualty. 
The Tait v. Peck decision conflicts with the prevailing decisional 
law of other jurisdictions.8 The ordinary rule making stock divi-
dends income when the fiduciary has the option to receive the 
dividends in cash or shares of stock has been held applicable to a 
Ii Anderaon v. Bean, 272 Mass. 4112, 172 N.E. 647 (19110); Brownell v. Anthony. 
189 Mass. 442. 75 N.E. 746 (1905); Rand v. Hubbell. 115 Mass. 461 (1874); Heard v. 
Eldredge. 109 Mass. 258 (1872); Deland v. Williams, 101 Mass. 571 (1869). 
6 Leland v. Hayden. 102 Mass. 542 (1869). 
71146 Mass. 521, 5110, 194 N.E.2d 707. 7111 (19611). 
8 Rosenburg v. Lombardi. 222 Md. 1146, 160 A.2d 601 (1960); Coates v. Coates. 304 
S.W.2d 874 (Mo. 1957); In re Snitzer's Estate, 311 Misc. 2d 692, 226 N.Y.s.2d 279 
(Surr. Ct. 1962); In re Bailey's Will, 20 Misc. 2d 5119. 188 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Surr. Ct. 
1959); In re Appleby's Estate, 15 Misc. 2d 200. 175 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Surr. Ct. 1958); 
In re Hurd's WiIl. 2011 Misc. 966. 120 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Surr. Ct. 19511); In re Byrne's 
Estate, 192 Misc. 451, 81 N.Y.s.2d 211 (Surr. Ct. 1948). 
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mutual fund's distribution of its shares representing capital gains.9 
Such an approach would ~ave its merits in the ordinary case because 
it relieves the trustee of the obligation to make an investigation of 
what may be complicated corporate financing and accounting to 
determine the source of the dividend. In the case at hand, however, 
no inquiry need be made as to the source of the distribution since 
a regulated investment company, by statute, must announce by 
written statement to the shareholder the source of the dividend.10 
Most of the other cases in opposition to Tait emphasize that the 
sale of securities by a mutual fund is in the ordinary course of its 
business; that the securities held by the investment company are 
the equivalent of the inventory of the corporation; and that when 
a corporation is in the business of buying and selling inventory 
from which it realizes profits, such profits are income and not 
principal. The dividend by the investment company is analogized 
to that received from a corporation engaged in the buying and 
selling of real estate.ll These cases place weight on the entity 
concept. It may be of some significance, however, that the Internal 
Revenue Code for income tax purposes treats the mutual fund as 
a conduit in characterizing the distribution in the hands of the share-
holder, placing the financial realities in the forefront.12 
The rule of Tait v. Peck appears to be more equitable in its 
application. Its opposite would give all capital gains to the life 
beneficiary and thrust all capital losses on the remainderman. Under 
Tait the gains allocable to corpus would not only benefit the re-
mainderman but would give the income beneficiary additional income 
produced by the increased principal,18 
§4.6. Charitable trusts: Cy pres. If a trust manifests a general 
charitable intent in addition to more particular charitable purposes, 
the doctrine of cy pres will be applied if it becomes impossible or 
impracticable to carry out the particular purposes.1 The doctrine 
9 Coates v. Coates, note 8 supra. 
10 See Investment Company Act of 1940, §19, 54 Stat. 789, 15 U.S.C. §§80a-l to 
80a-19 (1962). 
11 Rosenburg v. Lombardi, 222 Md_ 346, 160 A_2d 601 (1960); In re Bailey's Will, 
20 Misc. 2d 539, 188 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Surr. Ct. 1959); In re Byrne's Estate, 192 Misc. 
451, 81 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Surr_ Ct. 1948). 
12 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §852(a)(I), 26 U.S.C. §852(a)(I) (1962)_ 
13 Sec. 6(c) of the revised Uniform Principal and Income Act promulgated in 
1962 provides: "Distributions made from ordinary income by a regulated invest-
ment company or by a trust qualifying and electing to be taxed under Federal law 
as a real estate investment trust are income. All other distributions made by the 
company or trust, including distributions from capital gains, depreciation or deple-
tion, whether in the form of cash or an option to take new stock or cash or an 
option to purchase additional shares are principal." Sec. 6(e) of the Uniform Act 
~rovide8: "The trustee may rely upon any statement of the distributing corpora-
tion as to any fact relevant under any proviSion of this Act concerning the source 
or cltaracter of dividends or distributions of corporate assets." 
§4.6. 1 Grimke v. Attorney General, 206 Mass. 49, 91 N.E. 899 (1910); Jackson v. 
Phillips, 14 Allen 539 (Mass. 1867). 
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is, of course, inapplicable if the donor expresses his desire that 
his charitable gift be limited to a specified objective and no other. 
In Rogers v. Attorney General,2 although a testatrix set forth 
specific charitable objectives and failed to express a general charitable 
intent, a general charitable objective was inferred and the doctrine 
of cy pres applied. Her will devised her homestead in North 
Andover in trust 
to establish a home for aged women of said town, to be called 
"The Johnson Home for aged Women." I also give and devise 
to the said trustees the sum of twenty thousand dollars to help 
support and finish furnishing the house. . . . I request that 
no woman under sixty-five years of age, or who smokes or drinks 
be admitted as a member. I do not restrict as to nationality.3 
She also bequeathed specified furnishings and utensils to "the before 
mentioned trustees of the 'Johnson Home for Aged Women' for 
said home. . . ."4 She gave the residue of her estate to her three 
closest relatives. 
The testatrix died and her will was allowed in 1918. All in-
terested parties (including the Attorney General) concluded that it 
was impossible to comply literally with the terms of the trust. The 
Probate Court in 1962 entered a decree instructing the trustees not 
to make distribution to the residuary legatees and to present a plan 
for administering the trust in accordance with the doctrine of 
cy pres. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decree and rec-
ommended that some effort be made to frame a scheme that would 
include a suitable reference to the donor's family. 
Although the will contained no express statement of a general 
charitable purpose, and despite the specificity of the testatrix's desires 
to preserve the family homestead as a home for certain aged women 
of the town and to perpetuate the family name, the finding of a 
general charitable intent was not foreclosed.5 The decision corre-
sponds to the prevailing attitude to find a general charitable purpose 
when there is no expression of an intent to the contrary.6 The 
Supreme Judicial Court observed that there was no gift over in the 
event the trust should fail. Although a general residuary clause 
serves a function somewhat similar to a remainder over on the 
failure of a prior gift, it is not the same. "The use of a residuary 
clause does not per se manifest a desire to benefit the residuary 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 377, 196 N.E.2d 855. 
3Id. at 377-378, 196 N.E.2d at 858. 
4 Ibid. 
5 See Anna Jaques Hospital v. Attorney General, 341 Mass. 17~, 167 N.E.2d 875 
(1960), 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.12; Ford v. Rockland Trust Co., 331 Mass. 
25, 116 N.E.2d 669 (1954); Norris v. Loomis, 215 Mass. 344, 346, 102 N.E. 419, 420 
(1913); Grimke v. Attorney General, 206 Mass. 49, 91 N.E. 8W (1910). See also 
2 Restatement of Trusts Second §3W, Comment i (1959). 
8 See 4 Scott, Trusts §3W (2d ed. 1956). 
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legatees if the trust cannot be executed in the precise manner de-
scribed in the will."7 
§4.7. Legislation: Time of determining heirs. In justifying the 
canon of construction that a gift over to testator's "heirs" means 
those who answer that description at testator's death, Mr. Justice 
Holmes once remarked: 
The reasons for this rule are, that the words cannot be used 
properly to designate anybody else; that such a mode of ascertain-
ing the beneficiary implies that the testator has exhausted his 
specific wishes by the previous limitations, and is content there-
after to let the law take its course; and, perhaps, that the law 
leans toward a construction which vests the interest at the 
earliest moment.1 
It may well be that the canon does correspond to the desires of the 
average testator who inserts an end limitation in his will in favor 
of his "heirs" or "next of kin." After having made his specific 
desires known in the earlier provisions of the will, he in effect says 
"let the law take it course."2 Yet, partly because of the mass of 
litigation on the question whether a testator means "heirs" as of 
the date of his death or those who would have answered that descrip-
tion had he died at the time set for distribution, the canon may be 
suspect.s Whether the testator would have desired the results flowing 
from the application of the rule of construction had he actually 
anticipated them is a question which may be legitimately posed. 
In the ordinary case it may be argued that the rule would not 
correspond to the actual wishes of the donor had he thought about 
the results.4 The "heirs" or "next of kin" do not get to enjoy 
the gift until many years after the testator's death. It often happens 
that the application of the canon makes it necessary to reopen 
estates which have been closed many years - or new administration 
may be required because there was no will and otherwise no reason 
for administering the estate. The early vesting of the gift over 
to the "heirs" or "next of kin" of the donor would also seem to 
benefit those who would in no way be considered the objects of 
testator's bounty if the "heirs" or "next of kin" did not survive 
the period of distribution. 
Two jurisdictions have altered the rule of construction by statute.1 
7 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 377, 384, 196 N.E.2d 855, 862. 
§4.7. 1 Whall v. Converse, 146 Mass. M5, 348-349, 15 N.E. 660, 662 (1888). 
2 See Casner, Construction of Gifts to "Heirs" and the Like, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 
207, 228-241 (1939). 
3 See §4.5 supra. 
4 See Perkins, A Suggested Statute Concerning Gifts ,to Heirs, 48 Mas.. L.Q. 333 
(1963). 
I See Ind. Stat. Ann. §6-601(c) (Bums, 1953); Pa. Stat. Ann .• tit. 20. §§180.14(4). 
301.14(1) (Purdon. 1947). 
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In the 1964 SURVEY year Massachusetts became the third by enacting 
Chapter S07 of the Acts of 1964 which provides in part: 
In a limitation of real or personal property to a class described 
as the "heirs" or "next of kin" of a person, or described by words 
of similar import, to take effect in enjoyment upon the happening 
of an event within the period of the rule against perpetuities, the 
class shall, unless a contrary intention appears by the instrument 
creating such limitation, be determined as if such person died 
at the time of the happening of such event. 
The act specifically provides that it shall be effective only as to 
instruments executed after its effective date, January 1, 1965. 
§4.8. Other legislation. Chapter 288 of the Acts of 1964 amends 
General Laws, Chapter 191, Section 15, by increasing to $25,000 the 
dollar amount which a surviving spouse who elects against a will 
may claim in addition to designated portions of the remaining 
estate. 
Chapter S52, amending General Laws, Chapter 167, Section 4SA, 
authorizes national banks and savings and loan associations to pay 
funds not exceeding $750, standing in the name of a deceased de-
positor, to the surviving spouse or next of kin, if no demand for 
payment is made by the personal representative within sixty days 
of death. 
Chapter 470 of the Acts of 1964 amends General Laws, Chapter 65, 
Section 20, and requires the filing of an inventory with the Inheri-
tance Tax Bureau within three months of the appointment of a 
personal representative or trustee or within one year after the death 
of the deceased, whichever occurs first. 
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